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Executive Summary
On Apr. 22, 2019, United States (U.S.) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. would 
not be renewing the sanction waivers that had previously allowed eight economies (China, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Greece and Italy) to trade energy — which in practice means the purchase 
of crude oil and condensates — with Iran. Some economies that had been granted waivers, such as Italy 
and Taiwan, have already complied fully with the sanctions. However, economies that fail to comply with 
the sanctions and continue to buy oil from Iran after May 2 will be subject to full U.S. economic penalties (if 
the U.S. enforces the non-compliance). In response to the Apr. 22 announcement, benchmark Brent crude 
oil prices rose by more than 3%, to $70.71/ per barrel (bbl), that same day, eventually reaching a peak of 
$74.51/bbl — the highest price reported in the last six months. Crude oil exports constitute one-third of the 
Iranian government’s revenues and almost half of the country's total exports.
A recent S&P Global Platts (2019) survey put Saudi Arabian crude oil production for March 2019 at 9.87 
milllion barrels per day (MMbbl/d), the Kingdom’s lowest output since February 2017. Should the need arise, 
as a result of the expiring Iran waivers, Saudi Arabia (perhaps in coordination with the United Arab Emirates 
[UAE]) has the spare production capacity to step in and stabilize the global oil market by increasing output. 
However, it is not yet clear whether this will be necessary.
Three sources of uncertainty have unsettled global oil markets since Secretary Pompeo made his 
announcement: to what extent will these eight waiver economies, and other economies and/or actors that 
trade petroleum and petroleum products with Iran, comply with U.S. sanctions?; how aggressively and 
rapidly will the U.S. attempt to enforce these sanctions (and how long will such efforts persist)?; and, in turn, 
how will global oil markets react?
Based on KAPSARC modeling of the political decision-making process using the KAPSARC Toolkit for 
Behavioral Analysis (KTAB), we find that the international community, and indeed some of the waiver 
economies, will at best partially comply with renewed U.S. sanctions on Iranian crude oil and condensates. 
Our modeling also suggests that, in particular, China, India and Turkey are unlikely to comply fully with the 
U.S. sanctions strategy and will maintain much of their current oil trade with Iran. Greece, Italy and perhaps 
a few other countries may cautiously maintain a reduced level of trade with Iran while continuing to oppose 
the U.S. sanctions and lobby against them. There are many mechanisms that can enable oil trade with Iran 
to continue, some of which will be explored in this paper. Our modeling also suggests that there remains a 
high risk of U.S. capitulation in the face of international pressure to extend or reissue waivers, or to replace 
them with some equivalent mechanism.
Based on simulations from the KAPSARC Global Energy Macroeconometric Model (KGEMM) and the 
Oxford Economics Global Economic Model, we assess the oil price implications of lifting the waivers in 
four scenarios. The first scenario assumes that the tightened U.S. sanctions are completely ineffective; the 
second assumes a 40%-45% reduction in Iranian crude exports, in line with expectations derived from the 
KTAB simulations regarding the degree of anticipated compliance; the third assumes that sanctions are 
completely effective and eliminate Iranian crude exports; and the fourth assumes that Saudi Arabia offsets 
a complete elimination of Iranian crude exports by ramping up its spare oil production capacity, in order 
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to reduce volatility in oil prices and stabilize the global oil market. We find that the greater the reduction 
in Iranian crude oil available for export as a result of increasingly effective sanctions, the higher the price 
of oil, so long as Saudi Arabia does not offset the loss of Iranian crude exports by drawing on its spare 
production capacity. However, in the extreme case — where the tightened U.S. sanctions are completely 
effective in eliminating Iranian crude exports and Saudi Arabia fully replaces those barrels — then the 
traded price of oil will be effectively unchanged. Moreover, because of the non-linear relationship between 
oil production and global oil prices, any Saudi stabilization of the market should prove to be a net benefit to 
the world oil market. 
Even if no notable physical compliance with U.S. oil sanctions occurs, we still expect Iran to suffer 
financially. The U.S. Treasury’s global enforcement of separate financial sanctions, both against Iran and 
any entity that trades with Iran, will push transaction costs and risk premiums for Iran higher when dealing 
with the U.S. financial system, and add stress to the country’s already precarious balance of payments and 
banking system, as was the case during the wider 2011 U.S.-European Union (EU) economic sanctions. 
This will provide a disincentive for any entity to trade with Iran above and beyond oil sanctions.
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Background
After lengthy negotiations, the United Nations Security Council's 'P5+1' group (comprising the U.S., Russia, 
France, United Kingdom [U.K.] and China, plus Germany) and the EU agreed to the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in July 2015. Under this agreement, Iran committed to limit its enrichment 
of uranium in exchange for the lifting of ongoing economic sanctions by the West. On May 8, 2018, U.S. 
President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. On Nov. 5, 2018, 
the U.S. reinstated wide-ranging sanctions against Iran, pushing Brent crude oil prices to $73.17/bbl. The 
U.S. Treasury called this move “the toughest U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Iran,” geared to “target critical 
sectors of Iran's economy, such as energy, shipping and shipbuilding” (White House Fact Sheet 2019). Soon 
after this announcement, the U.S. granted renewable six-month waivers on the purchase of Iranian crude 
oil and condensate to eight economies: China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Greece and Italy. 
Iraq received a 90-day waiver in March 2019, allowing it to continue buying energy from Iran, with the stated 
intention of mitigating Iraqi electricity shortages ahead of the peak load summer months. 
The eight economies granted waivers received more than 75% of Iran’s registered crude oil and condensate 
exports in 2017 (authors’ own calculations from EIA data). After the U.S. move, five of the eight economies 
— loosely defined as U.S. allies — significantly reduced or even halted their oil imports from Iran; China, 
India and Turkey did not. As a result of the renewed U.S. sanctions, Iranian oil production fell steadily from 
3.8 MMbbl/d in May 2018 to 2.7 MMbbl/d in December 2018 (see Figure 1) — a near 30% drop — and has 
remained relatively stable since then. The BBC (2019) recently reported that Iranian oil exports are currently 
running at slightly less than 1 MMbbl/d, down from 2.5 MMbbl/d before the U.S. sanctions announcement in 
May 2018.
3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7
3.5 3.4 3.4
2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19
M
ill
io
n 
ba
rre
ls
 p
er
 d
ay
Source: EIA.
Figure 1: Iran monthly crude oil production (Apr 18-Mar 19).
Announcement of U.S.
withdrawal from JCPOA
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Background
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. would not renew the waivers for the original 
eight economies, and that the sanctions would come into effect full-force on May 2, 2019 (the disposition of 
the Iraqi waiver is not yet clear, since it is a special case). A White House statement the same day reiterated 
the U.S.’s commitment to slashing Iranian oil exports, stating that the administration’s aim was to “bring 
Iran’s oil exports [down] to zero, denying the regime its principal source of revenue” (White House Fact 
Sheet 2019). The announcement took markets by surprise and the price of Brent rose by more than 2% 
to $74.51/bbl the same day, marking its highest price since November 2018 (Kelly 2019). Despite the U.S. 
administration’s strong rhetoric against Iran, markets are uncertain as to how the removal of waivers and 
the re-imposition of sanctions will proceed.
We base our analysis in this paper on two models: the KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB) 
and the KAPSARC Global Energy Macroeconometric Model (KGEMM). KTAB is an open source modeling 
platform that facilitates the systematic and rigorous analysis of collective decision-making processes 
(for replication purposes, all documentation, source code, and papers can be found at http://www.ktab.
software). KGEMM is a policy analysis tool for examining the impacts of national-level decisions and their 
interaction with the global economy, including energy markets and the macroeconomic energy environment 
of Saudi Arabia. The model provides a holistic view of the Kingdom's energy-macroeconomic environment 
(Hasanov, Joutz and Mikayilov 2019). More details on KGEMM can be found at https://www.kapsarc.org/
research/projects/the-kapsarc-global-energy-macroeconometric-model-kgemm/
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Level of Compliance: A KTAB 
Simulation Analysis
KTAB simulates the collective decision-making process that encompasses the domestic and international 
politics of the U.S., Iran, Iranian oil importers and other influencers (referred to as ‘the actors’) that will 
shape national decisions to comply with sanctions and the evolving commitment to maintain sanctions over 
time. The model simulates the actors’ changing views on the appropriate level of compliance with U.S.-led 
sanctions on Iran that focus on crude oil and condensates, based on the evolving political pressures from 
various interests and centers of political power.
Since the May 2018 U.S. announcement that its sanctions against Iranian energy would be renewed, 
leading up to and beyond the announcement of waivers in November 2018, there has been broad 
disagreement across the international community about whether to comply (and to what extent) with the 
U.S. sanctions on the purchase of any Iranian crude and/or condensates. East Asian allies of the U.S., 
such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, were publicly much more supportive of the sanctions than many 
other nations (although they would have preferred to avoid sanctions altogether, and quietly lobbied the U.S. 
government to reconsider its approach). In contrast, China, India and Turkey made it clear they were not 
willing to fully comply with the renewed sanctions and were initially willing to provide only token compliance 
with U.S. objectives. 
Using the KTAB model, we conducted a simulation in November 2018 of the geopolitical process of 
decision-making regarding the sanctions (Efird 2018). We began this process before the waivers were 
announced and completed the analytic work just after the waivers were formally announced. The KTAB 
simulations imply at least partial U.S. capitulation on the issue of uniform compliance with the sanctions. 
Based on this finding, an alternative explanation for the waivers to that typically presented by U.S. 
officials and much of the Western media is that U.S. decision-makers recognized that they could not gain 
consensus support in favor of sanctions, which would severely undermine their effectiveness. Rather than 
proceed with the expectation of failure, the waivers were a face-saving effort by the U.S., in the hope that 
the passage of time would change the underlying geopolitical conditions.
Following Secretary Pompeo’s announcement on the end of the waivers, we updated our analysis in 
late April 2019. The results of our new simulations are not substantially different from those produced by 
the model in November 2018. We find once more that the majority of actors, both importers of Iranian 
crude and interested third parties (e.g., Russia and the European Union [EU]), all support at most partial 
compliance with sanctions. This reinforces the Chinese, Indian and Turkish desire to maintain a meaningful 
level of Iranian crude imports. We thus expect these three countries in particular to continue trading, 
whether through hidden or illicit channels, openly or through third parties. There is a recognition among 
these actors that some appeasement of the U.S. is required, which we interpret as a willingness to cut 
back on Iranian imports, but there is not sufficient support among the three for ending their imports of            
Iranian crude.
A number of Iran’s traditional energy customers have expressed their opposition to U.S. policy and a 
preference for continued trade with Iran — although if the energy sanctions are fully enforced by the 
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U.S., it will become much costlier for these actors to trade with Iran. Recent reports indicate that China 
is not positively disposed to the notion of complying with U.S. sanctions. For Turkey, buying Iranian oil at 
a discount, as it has done for the last year or so, is an attractive option for Ankara, as Turkey is currently 
experiencing an economic recession. The EU has openly expressed its preference to continue trading with 
Iran with a view toward keeping Tehran’s commitment to the P5+1 nuclear deal alive. Indian policy toward 
Iran sanctions has recently become somewhat more aligned with that of the U.S.; the November 2018 
waivers effectively halved India’s oil imports from Iran, with only state-owned refineries in India permitted to 
buy Iranian oil (Verma 2019). Nonetheless, full compliance with U.S. sanctions would be too costly for India, 
and is thus not a desirable option for the country.
Our April 2019 KTAB simulations also point once more to U.S. acquiescence on this issue, though the 
model is not precise enough to anticipate how the details of this may unfold. This suggests that full 
enforcement and punitive measures against economies that do not comply with U.S. sanctions may 
not be uniformly applied. Additionally, there are several other potential mechanisms that could reflect 
the U.S. backing-off a hardline stance of full compliance with its sanctions. It could be that waivers are 
reinstated in some form, perhaps repackaged and renamed for political effect. U.S. law also provides 
guidelines for a progressive implementation of sanctions. With only two weeks’ notice, it would be difficult 
for most economies to fully implement U.S. sanction requirements. The significant reduction exception 
(SRE) allows for a 180-day grace period if the country in question shows a good faith effort to begin 
complying with sanctions (Nephew 2019). This 180-day grace period is renewable. Or, it could be that non-
compliance with sanctions is simply ignored, and a public narrative of success by U.S. policymakers is 
used to distract from the actual behavior.
Regardless of the mechanics of how any sanctions’ non-compliance will play out, the results of the KTAB 
simulations point to a 40%-45% reduction in Iranian crude oil and condensate exports after the waivers are 
lifted and the sanctions are fully in effect. Based on this finding, we consider this the most likely outcome 
but will explore three alternative scenarios for comparison in the rest of this paper.
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Though the KTAB simulation results suggest that a 40%-45% reduction in Iranian crude oil exports is 
the most likely outcome, we have evaluated a range of alternative scenarios to provide a comparison of 
different possible reactions to the lifting of the waivers. We used KGEMM and the Oxford Economics Global 
Economic Model to simulate four scenarios after the removal of waivers and full implementation of the       
U.S. sanctions:
1. No change in Iranian crude oil exports
2. A 42% reduction of Iranian crude oil exports (0.5 MMbbl/d)
3. Complete cessation of Iranian crude oil exports (1.2 MMbbl/d) without any change in Saudi 
production
4. End of Iranian crude oil exports (1.2 MMbbl/d) completely offset by increased Saudi production (i.e., 
an increase of 1.2 MMbbl/d) to stabilize the global oil market
The first scenario can be considered a reference case. It assumes that Iranian exports continue, unaffected 
by the end of waivers, and is based on a projection derived from April 2019 data. In the second and third 
scenarios, Iranian crude oil exports drop, while the supply from all other global oil exporters remains 
unchanged. For scenario 2, this results in a shortage of 0.5 MMbbl/d. This scenario incorporates the 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of the sanctions on Iranian exports, and is in line with the expected level 
of compliance derived in the KTAB analysis. For scenario 3, we assume full compliance with sanctions, 
which would produce a shortage of 1.2 MMbbl/d. This scenario defines the upper limit for any price 
increase. For scenarios 2 and 3, we expect a higher global crude oil price as compared to the price under 
scenario 1.
In the fourth scenario, Iranian crude oil exports drop by 1.2 MMbbl/d between Q3 of 2019 and Q4 of 2020, 
but are wholly offset by additional output from Saudi Arabia. This is made possible by Saudi Arabia’s 
spare production capacity, which amounted to 2.2 MMbbl/d in March 2019, according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). This results in no change to the modeled oil price and higher export revenues for 
Saudi Arabia, as it ramps up its crude oil exports by an average of 1.2 MMbbl/d — thus demonstrating the 
Kingdom’s ability to stabilize the market in the face of a major supply disruption.
All scenarios keep Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s domestic oil use unchanged so that any adjustments in either 
country’s production are reflected in their oil exports. We compare the results of these different scenarios 
in Table 1, which differentiates the impact on the oil price based on scenarios 1, 2 and 3. We will treat 
scenario 4 separately. 
The oil price increases in the third scenario, from $63/bbl in Q3 of 2019 to $82.44/bbl in Q4 of 2020. In 
scenario 2, the oil price increases by around $6/bbl (or about 9.6%) more with respect to the scenario 1 
reference case, in which no sanctions are applied to post-April 2019 Iranian oil production. On average, 
the oil price in the third scenario increases by around $17/bbl (or about 26%) more than in scenario 1, the 
reference case.
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The price increase in scenario 3 compared to scenario 2 is about three times higher, while the quantity 
reduction in scenario 2 compared to scenario 3 is only about 42% lower with respect to the first scenario 
(recall that the 42% reduction is based on the KTAB simulation results). Thus, the scenario analysis 
anticipates that any reduction in Iranian oil exports will raise the price of oil no later than Q4 of 2019. The 
price differential for scenario 2 compared to that in scenario 1 (i.e., the reference case) increases over time, 
reaches its maximum in Q2 of 2020 and then decreases. This is potentially caused by the persistency in 
the oil prices, the lagged effects of supply and demand-side factors, and the influences of political and 
economic shocks. 
All scenarios keep Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s domestic oil use unchanged so that any changes in either 
country’s production are reflected in their oil exports.
As previously mentioned, scenario 4 provides a view of Saudi oil export revenues if Saudi Arabia is to fully 
replace the loss of Iranian crude oil exports. As this offset in supply will result in no net impact on supply in 
the global oil market, the simulations indicate that prices will remain effectively the same as in scenario 1. 
Table 2 provides the results of the simulations for the fourth scenario.
Saudi Arabia has long been a reliable source of oil and maintains significant spare capacity. In the event 
that Iranian crude oil exports are eliminated from the market after the waivers are lifted, then Saudi Arabia 
could easily make up for the 1.2 MMbbl/d shortfall. As expected, the simulations indicate that the oil price in 
scenario 4 remains effectively unchanged. Recall that the price increase in scenario 3 is about three times 
higher than that seen in scenario 2, while the quantity reduction in scenario 2 compared to scenario 3 is 
only about 42% lower than seen in the first scenario. Thus, the price effect from the oil production cut is 
non-linear. As a result, the benefit of the Saudi Arabian offset strategy is beneficial for the world oil market 
(in terms of stabilizing the market) in this scenario.
Table 1. Comparison of results from scenarios 1, 2 and 3.
Source: KAPSARC KGEMM analysis.
Oil price patterns for scenarios 1-3
Quarter Oil price, $/bbl in scenario 1
Oil price, $/bbl in 
scenario 2
Oil price, $/bbl in 
scenario 3
% change deviation 
of scenario 2 from 
scenario 1
% change deviation 
of scenario 3 from 
scenario 1
2019 Q3 63.00 63.00 63.00 0.00 0.00
2019 Q4 63.90 67.50 72.93 5.63 14.13
2020 Q1 63.90 70.14 80.00 9.76 25.20
2020 Q2 64.79 72.39 85.04 11.74 31.26
2020 Q3 64.88 72.11 85.06 11.15 31.11
2020 Q4 64.97 71.25 82.44 9.67 26.89
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Source: KAPSARC KGEMM analysis.
Scenario 4: Iran crude exports cut by 1.2 MMbbl/d and offset by an increase in                                                                  
Saudi Arabian production of 1.2 MMbbl/d 
Year
Saudi Arabian (KSA) 
oil export revenues, 
million Saudi riyals 
(SAR) in scenario 1
KSA oil export 
revenues, million SAR 
in scenario 2
Absolute difference 
from scenario 1
% change from 
scenario 1
2019 571,922 611,258 39,336 6.88
2020 602,192 684,393 82,201 13.65
Table 2. Scenario 4 results for Saudi Arabia’s oil export revenues.
Saudi Arabian oil production increases in scenario 4 on average by about 10% during the period under 
consideration. As a result, the country's oil export revenues increase in line with its oil export volumes, as 
shown in Table 2. Moreover, Saudi oil export revenues grow by about 7% in 2019 and about 14% in 2020. 
Note that the increase in revenue also includes refined products, so the increase in monetary revenue 
is higher than the quantity increase. The larger benefit, for both Saudi Arabia and the rest of the global 
economy, is the expected reduction in price volatility and overall market stabilization.
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What Happens Next?
Our analysis suggests that little will change in the near term as the Iranian regime remains unwilling to 
respond to U.S. demands regarding its nuclear power program. Currently, most Iranians regard the country's 
faltering economy and unemployment as their country’s main problems. More economic sanctions of any 
sort will clearly add to the country’s economic woes. However, Iran has experienced similar conditions before 
(though perhaps not to the degree that may be prompted by the newly tightened U.S. sanctions, assuming 
the international community fully complies with those sanctions). The enactment of the 2008 Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act, for instance, created a peculiar situation: official bank lending interest rates fell below deposit 
interest rates just before the official enactment of the sanctions. This negative 'spread' officially continued for 
many years (see Figure 2). The Iranian government employed various fiscal and monetary policies to keep its 
financial markets functioning. These included further controls on capital mobility and brief closures of banks to 
evade consumer panic. The new U.S. sanctions are likely to bring about similar challenges to Iran’s economy. 
In this respect, the willingness of some big buyers of Iranian crude oil to (at least partially) continue trading 
oil with Iran could provide the authorities in Tehran with some room to maneuver. If the KTAB simulations 
are correct, and we can expect a 40%-45% reduction in Iranian crude exports fairly soon, then the domestic 
political situation in Iran may become threatening, if not fatal, to the current regime.
Figure 2: Announcement of 2008 sanctions and Iran interest rates.
Source: World Bank, TIES Dataset.
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What Happens Next?
It is noteworthy that the Iranian public does not view sanctions as the main reason for their country’s poor 
economic situation. A December 2018 survey conducted by IranPoll found that while 71% of respondents 
thought the economy was performing badly, only 36% ascribed this economic mismanagement to 
sanctions (Farmanesh 2019). The majority of respondents (59%) said Iran’s economic woes were due to the 
government's domestic mismanagement of the economy. Recent data on Iran public opinion also shows the 
public may not hold the regime culpable for all of Iran’s economic problems. A January 2018 poll conducted in 
Iran by the U.S. University of Maryland indicated the Iranian public’s support for the JCPOA has substantially 
decreased, with many respondents citing “benefits not accruing to Iran’s economy following this agreement” 
as their main reason for their withdrawal of support for the nuclear treaty (Mohseni, Gallagher and Ramsay 
2018). The Iranian public also perceives the U.S. as an active obstacle to peace. These perceptions allow the 
Iranian authorities to rally people around the flag and divert attention from their economic mismanagement. 
Without public sentiment holding the Iranian government responsible for economic hardship as a result of its 
foreign policy, the opposition will struggle to leverage the U.S. energy sanctions to effectively challenge the 
current regime in Iran.
Given the surprise granting of waivers in November 2018, we would expect any Saudi decision to step up 
production again to be conditional on the Saudi government’s understanding of the strength of U.S. resolve 
with respect to ending all sanctions waivers, as well as Riyadh’s assessment of the actual reduction in Iranian 
oil exports and production as a result of the sanctions. Indeed, the Saudi Oil Minister, H.E. Khalid Al-Falih has 
stated that the Kingdom would not increase oil production “preemptively” as the market was “well-supplied,” 
despite the U.S. sanctions (Financial Times 2019).
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